Kassir was referring to the behavior of Lebanon’s politicians, who in their eagerness to retain power had watered down many of the revolution’s original goals. But his comment could just as easily be used to describe the Bush administration then and since. Having once described its military intervention in the Middle East as an effort to advance Arab democracy, Washington—beleaguered by Iraq and a rising Iran—has now returned to the comforting familiarity of alliances with Arab despots.
Three years on, Arab democracy seems to have vanished from the U.S. debate. (The exception to this rule is Lebanon, where a great many people proved willing to pick up on Washington’s democracy rhetoric.) None of the candidates likely to succeed President George W. Bush seems interested in pressing the cause. Foreign-policy “realism”—which stresses the pursuit of national interests over the advancement of values such as democracy and human rights—has regained the upper hand. More and more American decision makers seem to believe that Arab societies are socially, culturally and institutionally unprepared for democracy.
Such fatalism will only impede Washington’s ability to craft smart policies. This is dangerous both for the Middle East and the United States. Supporting tyrannical governments will further erode America’s already low standing in the region, and is likely to backfire tactically. Friendly despots, such as Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak or the Saudi kings, may seem resilient, but they are weaker and less legitimate today than ever before, presiding as they do over corrupt and decrepit political systems.
Supporting tyrants is also the best way to feed Islamic extremism. It is precisely the absence of Arab democracy— a situation made worse by U.S. support for dictators—that hardened anti-Americanism in many Middle Eastern states in the past, leading to the emergence of the men responsible for the 9/11 attacks.
Of course, while America’s reputation in the Middle East has declined in recent years, it was never that high in the first place. Rather than pursue the mirage of popularity, however, Washington should work harder to make a difference—that, and only that, will earn it backing from the Arab Street.
That’s why, now more than ever, the United States must reaffirm its support for Arab democracy. How Washington goes about this is critical. America tends to be clumsy when imposing its principles abroad, and events in Abu Ghraib and Guant?namo have undermined, in many Arab eyes, the nation’s claim to stand for human rights and freedom.
So how exactly should the United States handle the Middle East in the coming years? For starters, Washington should gradually build democratic stepping stones in the region, consolidating democracy or democratic practices in some places in order to encourage democratic tendencies elsewhere. The United States should also remember that, although democracy cannot be spread with the barrel of a gun, the use of force in favor of democratic movements—or the threat to intervene—can still prove decisive at critical moments.
The United States should consider several lessons from Lebanon’s experience. First, the ad hoc nature of the 2005 demonstrations against Syria teaches that democracy promotion can be a messy and unpredictable process. In some places, liberal impulses will triumph; in others, they will fail. Democracy is unlikely to break out everywhere at the same time. But when it does, as in Lebanon, Washington should be ready to support it.
Democracy is unpredictable in another sense as well: in terms of whom the people choose to elect. In many places, Islamists are now the only organized opposition that exists to authoritarian regimes, since these tyrants have suffocated liberals. That’s why free votes in places such as Egypt and Jordan would likely bring more Islamists to power. America thus faces a stark choice: to help either the autocrats or the Islamists. It should not rule out dealing with the former. But its priority must be to more aggressively build and defend a secular liberal center.
The process will require great patience and will be characterized by ignorance and misunderstanding on all sides. There will be times when the United States will decide to side with unsavory regimes to suit its geopolitical needs. And Arab liberals will, out of a sense of nationalism, sometimes prefer a homegrown dictator to Washington’s help. But local liberals and Americans must remember that their ultimate interests lie together. The absence of domestic freedoms in the Middle East will only turn more and more Arabs against the United States. And liberals who refuse outside support will become even more vulnerable than they are today. The best way to improve Washington’s image, therefore, is for the United States to help create more open societies in the region.
The Bush administration was naive to assume that the overthrow of Saddam Hussein would transform the Middle East into a citadel of democracy. But it was right about the power of political emancipation. For Washington to turn its back on all that now and abandon the cause of Arab freedom would be disastrous. The Middle East is moving toward more openness; change is coming one way or another. The United States would be better off shaping the outcome itself, rather than allowing others far less concerned about democracy to do so.
Young is opinion editor of The Daily Star newspaper in Lebanon and a contributing editor of Reason magazine in the United States.
